



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-289-69
13 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Centralization of Processing and Reporting (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-339-68, dated 31 May 1968, subject: "Unified and Specified Command Participation in the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) (U)."

b. A memorandum by the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the Director, National Security Agency (NSA), dated 13 September 1968, subject: "Cryptologic 5-Year Plan."

2. (C) Reference 1a included a recommendation by USCINCEUR that an assessment be made of the effects of the centralization of SIGINT processing and reporting at NSA, Fort Meade, Maryland. The assessment, which was based on studies by the US Army and the US Air Force, was completed and its findings circulated to the commanders of the unified and specified commands, who concurred in the findings.

3. (TSU) A summary of the findings is as follows:

a. The existing centralization has relegated the role of analytical personnel at certain overseas Service cryptologic field activities to one of data reduction and pro forma technical reporting in order to meet the NSA requirements in support of the centralization concept. This action has thereby reduced the capability of these stations to perform essential analysis and to maintain an appropriate data base in support of time-sensitive SIGINT reporting to military commanders.

906575

Copy No. 29A of 29 Copies

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-17-2012
pursuant to E.O. 13526

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

0022-945-67

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

b. The centralization concept has already reduced and will, over the long term, further reduce the experience, skills, and motivation of military analysts to a point that will degrade their ability to provide time-sensitive SIGINT support to the military commanders.

c. The total US cryptologic effort will be further adversely affected by a policy of continuing reduction in processing and reporting manpower at overseas field activities where Service cryptologic analytical and reporting skills are best developed.

d. Field commanders' requirements for warning and indications information from overseas Service cryptologic field activities during periods of tension, crises, or hostilities cannot be satisfied from CRITIC, SPOT, and ELECTRIGRAM reporting alone. The NSA summaries are not considered timely or responsive during these periods. Moreover, since effective and timely SIGINT reporting is a function of analytical expertise and an adequate and current data base, the removal of processing and reporting to Fort Meade has degraded, and will continue to degrade, overseas field site capability to produce accurate and meaningful CRITIC, SPOT, and ELECTRIGRAM reports.

e. Centralization is concentrating the bulk of the US military expertise in SIGINT processing and reporting at one location, thereby maximizing the vulnerability of SIGINT support to disruption through the loss of communications or other causes.

NSA 3.3b(3) f. The increases made and proposed to the number of processing and reporting personnel in Service cryptologic units in [redacted] during the Czechoslovakian crisis and in South Vietnam substantiate the requirement for overseas Service cryptologic field processing activities during crises and hostilities.

4. (C) Based upon the findings listed above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Selective increases in field processing and reporting capabilities be authorized at overseas Service field activities where deficiencies have been identified and for which resources have been requested by the military departments in their annual Consolidated Cryptologic Program submissions.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

b. The Cryptologic 5-Year Plan now being developed by NSA in collaboration with the military departments, as noted in reference 1b, identify and provide for that level of SIGINT processing and reporting which is necessary at overseas cryptologic activities to meet the time-sensitive requirements of the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

c. Further centralization of SIGINT processing and reporting be held in abeyance pending completion of the Cryptologic 5-Year Plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David I. Lieberman

DAVID I. LIEBMAN
Major General, USAF
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Copy to:
Director, NSA

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~